Page 19: of Offshore Engineer Magazine (Jun/Jul 2013)

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Perspectives

Analysis need to examine whether the regula- tions are still ft for purpose, and if

Progress after Piper they are able to evolve with the indus- try’s changing needs, technologies, and th and effectively operating systems that practices.

As the 25 anniversary of the manage those risks. There are hard lessons learned from

UK North Sea Piper Alpha such disasters. While the US drasti- disaster approaches, cally revised its regulatory regime in

Learning from past catastrophes

Regulations put in place after the the wake of the Macondo disaster,

GL Noble Denton looks at

Piper Alpha disaster have helped would it have made a difference had regulatory best practice.

the industry build a stronger safety it amended its approach sooner? culture. This includes the UK require- Although there is no defnitive answer he 25-year anniversary of the ment for operators to demonstrate that to this question, the likelihood of such

Piper Alpha disaster provides an they are taking measures to manage an event would probably have been

T important opportunity to stop and hazards and reduce risks to become as reduced. refect on the progress made by oil and low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) The source of a disaster can be a gas companies and regulatory regimes and the role played by the UK Health long-term degradation of equipment or on safety and integrity. But we all need and Safety Executive in enforcing (and a short-term oversight (e.g. shortcuts to remain vigilant if we are to continue made in the face of time pressure). An to mitigate the risks of future such incident is often enabled by a lapse disasters. in safety management; for example, a

The anniversary of the Piper Alpha risk management process that gradu- catastrophe in the North Sea provides ally, over time, becomes less effective a poignant reminder of just how far due a human willingness to attempt, or the oil and gas industry has come in accept, shortcuts. the last 25 years. It also reminds us The roots of the Macondo disaster how potentially catastrophic it can be are very different, yet there are paral- for companies across the oil and gas lels to be found to Piper Alpha in the supply chain if their safety and risk health and safety culture and working management processes do not operate practices that allowed the causes of the effectively. incident to be missed until it became

In our industry, the difference too late. between a near miss and a serious incident can often be minimal. A

Reactions to US regulatory change simple oversight or error, or a gradual In April 2013, GL Noble Denton set habituation to a minor fault can feel out to measure industry reaction less harmful the longer it is tolerated. to recent changes in the US regula-

Piper Alpha memorial, designed and

Seemingly inconsequential factors can tory regime. The resulting report, sculpted in bronze by Sue Jane Taylor, set off a catastrophic chain of events, Reinventing Regulation: The impact of and installed in Hazlehead Park, as seen at Piper Alpha in 1988, at the US reform on the oil and gas indus-

Aberdeen in 1991.

Buncefeld oil storage facility—where a try, reveals how tough the oil and gas fuel leak, in 2005, resulted in the larg- regulatory landscape has become in est explosion that the UK has seen in updating) the Safety Case regulations. the US, post-Macondo, according to oil its peacetime history—and at Macondo While there is much in which to and gas professionals operating there. in 2010. fnd merit in the UK’s regulatory An overwhelming majority (85%) said

The challenge for oil and gas compa- regime, the anniversary of the Piper that they expect the US regulatory nies and their regulators lies in recog- Alpha disaster, as well as more recent regime to get tougher in the com- nizing where the risks lie, and creating incidents, reminds us once again of the ing two years, on top of the changes oedigital.com June 2013 | OE 21 006OE_0613Analysis_Qstats.indd 21 5/25/13 12:28 AM