Page 90: of Maritime Reporter Magazine (November 2011)

by Joe Keefe, posted October 5, 2011My good friend, Captain Tom Hudson, an Operations Superintendent with Mit-sui O.S.K. Bulk Shipping (USA) Inc.gave me a call to discuss something that had been bothering him for quite sometime. He referred me to a ?near-miss? sit- uation that occurred on one his tankers over the summer; one which has now taken on heightened meaning for all ships traveling in U.S. waters because of how the event has been interpreted by local Coast Guard officials. Almost three months later, Hudson has been on a one- man campaign to make right what he be- lieves goes much deeper than a single (near) mishap. From where I sit, it is acause worth fighting for. Here?s why: Near Miss ? Another Day at Sea? On 10 July in the Bayport Channel, oneof Hudson?s ships experienced what he characterized as ?a bank sheer.? Also ac- cording to Hudson, the ship was success- ful in regaining control and there was no damage, injury or potential to damage theenvironment. The ?near miss? was rec- ognized and the vessel gathered all avail- able information from the incident for areview by the office. Hudson learned about the event approximately two hours after it happened. Although MOL rou- tinely looks at all ?near misses? inter- nally to make sure that they do not happen again, Hudson saw no reason to notify the Coast Guard, but did so any- way, primarily to cover all the bases. A few hours after the agent's call, the local Coast Guard Sector's Investigation De- partment visited the ship. They picked up the information from the ship, took state-ments and assisted the Captain with the2692. At that time there was no mention of any need for further material from the ship ? indeed, 10 weeks later, also ac- cording to Hudson - there still has beenno effort to obtain further information from the ship, pilot or tugs.) Prior to ves- sel?s departure, Hudson visited the ship and obtained copies of all information re-lated to the event, primarily to prepare a presentation to use the value of the near miss as a tool to understand the event. Later, however, when the ship left the dock, the Coast Guard Investigator noti- fied the ship to go to anchor and await clearance. After several hours at anchor, Hudson learned that the ship was delayed for a "needed" Class report. The internal inspection done by the Chief Officer was not sufficient proof of the vessel?s safety for the purposes of the Coast Guard. Be-yond this, Hudson was incredulous to discover that the ship had been fined $250 for running aground and had beenfurther fined $5,000 for late notice. The vessel lost a half day's hire (> $10,000) and the charterer probably a good dealmore. A Class report did not provide any additional information. And, after incur- ring the cost of divers and an extensive internal investigation, there has yet to be any indication that the vessel ever touched bottom.Casualty Reporting Plans to expand what can be inter- preted to be a ?Marine Casualty? are said to be underway, with that en- hanced reporting requirement to come as early as January of 2012. Report- edly, any event listed in 46CFR4.03-1 (as examples of what might cause a ca-sualty) must be reported. Where it isapparently heading is that every tripped circuit breaker and/or false alarm bell must now be reported promptly to the Coast Guard. Hudson told MarPro , how- ever, ?I am in complete agreement that near misses must be studied by the ship(and management) to prevent casualties in the future. However, I do not think the intent of Congress enacting 46 U.S.C.6101 to devote the resources needed to record all possible events that might lead to a casualty. I believe that an incident must first be a casualty, before one de- cides if it is a ?marine? casualty. And if it is not a casualty (so not a marine casu-alty), there is no requirement for a re-port.? But, in this case, the rapidly festering problem goes much deeper. The Culture of Blame In the second quarter print edition ofMaritime Professional magazine, the value of Quality Audits is discussed in depth, with the ultimate message that?Quality Audits Matter,? and an explana- tion of why you should care. In the arti- cle, it is explained that ??management welcomes the audit findings. They en- courage internal and external auditors to provide findings which could be useful for improving company processes. Such managers do not discourage staff when non-conformities are reported, as thosefindings are considered tools for im- provement or opportunities for growth.? That?s well said and good advice. Looking back at our ?near miss? on theHouston Ship Channel, and using theabove logic, this was certainly an oppor- tunity for improvement and/or growth. Instead, it has been turned into an event which shipboard personnel and office workers alike will long remember: even if nothing tangible happens, we?re still in trouble. And, in that scenario, the likeli- hood of future ?near misses? being re-ported to the authorities or even internal supervisors is reduced to two possibili- ties: slim and none. Quality Audit pro- fessionals call this deadly cycle the ?Culture of Blame.? That?s because it goes counter to virtually every principle of good ship safety management.So, on July 10th, two appropriately cre- dentialed and experienced marine pro- fessionals ? the harbor pilot and theship?s Master ? teamed up to move a large, deep draft tanker up the channel to safely moor it alongside the intendedberth. Eventually, that?s exactly what happened. Along the way, the job got a little harder when the ship apparently didnot handle as intended, but the folks charged with driving the boat adjusted their methods and because they were skilled mariners, the end result was a good one. That?s the way it is supposed to be and that?s why they get paid well. When a Near-Miss Becomes a Casualty A look back is a good thing. Did this, asthe quality auditor might say, involve a non-conformity? I don?t think so. What it did entail is an event in which a poten- tially destructive result was averted and the methods employed to do that ought to be widely disseminated for all to see. At the same time, the events leading up to the point where this situation manifesteditself need to be similarly examined to determine what and if happened to putthe vessel into an ?iffy? situation. That shouldn?t involve fines and penalties. How this event got the point of becom- ing a punitive police action by the na- tion?s top marine watchdogs is beyond me. But, it brings us back to the real- ization that the U.S. Coast Guard, as much as five years ago realized that it had lost its edge in terms of marine in-spection and technical skills. A con- certed effort is underway to right that ship and bring the Coast Guard?s ma- rine safety mission back up to a rea- sonable standard. This includes, amongother things, enhanced training at so-called ?centers of excellence? and the ac- tive recruitment of experienced commercial mariners and other civilian marine professionals into the CoastGuard to shore up a mission that had lostits way. That said; events like the one de- scribed by Captain Hudson in July do notnecessarily provide any measure of com- fort that improvements are happening. The same organization that routinely sub-contracts important inspection dutiesto certain, appropriately qualified classi- fication societies also should be able to take those same folks at their word when they say that a vessel is in compliance with no apparent damages or evidence that anything untoward has occurred. And, that?s just what has happened. In the wake of all that, no fines have ever been collected by the Coast Guard and the ini-tial penalties ? according to Hudson ?have since been reduced to letters of warning. Still, the delays and expenses incurred by the vessel, its operator and charterers were needless. On July 10th of this year, no damage to any ship or facility occurred in the port of Houston or Bayport. No oil was spilled and no one was injured. No hulls got dented and no anti-fouling paint gotscraped against a murky bottom. Never- theless, a responsible operator and itstechnical personnel are examining an anomaly that occurred during a channelpassage with the ultimate goal of makingan already safe vessel ? and fleet ? even better. They even let the local authorities know of their efforts in a reasonably timely manner. And, that?s the way it should be. Period. BLOGSFROM MARITIMEPROFESSIONAL.COMJoin the conversation @ MaritimeProfessional.com ? the largest maritime professional group on the internet with more than 19,000 members and growing. Every business day MaritimeProfessional.com delivers insightful news and analysis from correspondents around the globe. Below are ex- cerpts from select recent BLOG posts. MaritimeProfessional.comFostering a culture of blame at sea. 90Maritime Reporter & Engineering News When Near Misses Become Casualties ? or not? MR Nov.11 # 12 (89-96):MR Template 11/4/2011 12:16 PM Page 90