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By David Rider, Neptune Maritime In September 2011, as the monsoonbegan to blow itself out, there were grave warnings from a number of sources and analysts that the shipping industry couldexpect to see a significant surge in pirate activity as conditions in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean became more favor- able. Captain Keith Blount, chief of staff with EU NAVFOR, told the press 1, ?Ithink we are going to see a surge in piracy because we always have done at this time when the southwest monsoonabates and the seas become flatter.? But as conditions cleared, the antici-pated increase in pirate activity failed to materialize, to the surprise of many in the industry. This was all the more remark- able given the business model of Somali pirates, which demands that they hijack high value targets which can be ransomed for huge sums which are then used to payoff the investors who supply the equip- ment used by the pirates, their food andthat of their hostages and so on. Without a reasonable turnover of hijacked vessels, pirates begin to run up big bills in their home ports and those cut into their profit margins. Pirates towards the end of 2011 were very much on the back foot, and suc- cessful hijackings were suddenly few and far between.The data speaks for itself. 2010 saw 210 incidents attributed to Somali pirates,according to figures supplied by the In- ternational Maritime Bureau (IMB)2. In2011, this figure increased to 231 but, while 2010 saw 49 vessels hijacked, last year there were only 26 successful hi-jackings. While October 20113saw some 26 at- tacks by Somali pirates on merchant andfishing vessels, only one of those attacks resulted in a ?win? for the pirates; the MT Liquid Velvet, a Greek-owned chemical tanker which was hijacked on October 31 as she transited from Suez to India. InJanuary 2012, NATO reported that the Liquid Velvet had been turned in to a pi- rate mothership and had left Somalia, onthe hunt for other prey. Fortunately, naval forces disrupted this plan but the vessel remains in the hands of its Somali hi-jackers. While 26 attempted attacks is certainlya large number for one month, the fact that only one vessel was successfully hi- jacked is significant and signaled that the tide was perhaps beginning to turn on the pirates. Until the fourth quarter of 2011,pirates had enjoyed continued success in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Aden (GoA), despite the presence of EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta and NATO Operation Ocean Shield warships. The ?good guys? have an area approximately the size of Europe to patrol, which has always made early interdiction of pirates a difficult task, particularly given the amount of small boat traffic in the GoA. The industry continued to hold its col-lective breath, waiting for more attacks and hijackings as the monsoon abated.However, October proved to be the pi- rates? most active month that quarter, as November would reinforce. EU NAV- FOR initially listed 12 pirate attacks forthe month, later downsizing this to just 11 attacks, of which only one resulted ina successful hijacking. Again, the figures confounded received wisdom. From the pirates? perspective, December was to prove little better, with EU NAVFOR re- porting just three pirate attacks for themonth, although one of those was indeed a ?hit? for the pirates, as the MT Enrico Ievoli enjoyed the dubious honour of be- coming the last vessel to be hijacked in 2011, falling into pirate hands on De- cember 27 approximately 215 nauticalmiles East by Northeast of Salalah, lessthan 40nm from the Oman coast.Suddenly, 2011 had become the year the pirates failed and the expected surge spluttered to a halt. The big question is, why? A number of factors have been cited as possible causes in the drop-off of pirate activity. Kenya?s military forces have been present in Somalia for some time,fighting Al Shabaab insurgents across the country and this has been pointed to bysome in the media as being partly re-sponsible for the lack of pirate surge. Ac- tivity on the ground by the authorities in Puntland, Somalia?s semi-autonomous state, have also affected pirates. Recent arrests, including one which saw 150 pi- rates scooped up in one raid4, have no doubt caused pirates some discomfortand one cannot discount the persistentpresence of NATO and EU NAVFOR pa- trols in the area as damaging pirate oper- ations. They regularly interdict and disrupt pirate mother ships and dhows, and this too must affect pirate success figures. Examination of the data, however, highlights another factor which has miti- gated pirate attacks: the presence of armed guards onboard merchant vessels. Whilst most official sources view them with ambivalence, there is absolutely no doubt that in the fourth quarter of 2011,they played a significant role in defeating piracy. Of the 26 pirate attacks conducted inOctober 2011, a staggering 16 of themwere repelled by armed guards 5.In No-vember, EU NAVFOR?s updated figures stated that 11 attacks took place. Five of those vessels had an armed Vessel Pro- tection Team (VPT) onboard. It should be noted that whilst the MT Liquid Velvet, successfully hijacked on October 31st, had a ?security advisor? onboard, he was unarmed. Sadly, the MT Enrico Ievoli, taken on December 27th, had neither a VPT nor even a citadel for its crew to re- treat to in times of danger. While the figures make interesting reading, further evidence of the success of armed VPTs can be found on the ground in Somalia. Robert Young Pelton is the Publisher of SomaliaReport.com, one of the bestnews sources in-country and a vital re- source for anyone interested in breaking Somali news stories and pirate activity. Who better to ask why piracy was at such a low level towards the end of 2011? ?A very simple answer. Armed security on ships. When we analyze every single regional (HOA) contact between the mar- itime industry and pirates, over 90% of the reasons why pirates broke off attacks, hovered then left or made initial attempts to board. The use of warning shots, shots to the skiff engines and the use of visible force prevented a successful attack,? said Pel- ton.Somalia Report has widely covered moves by officials in Puntland to prevent piracy, as Pelton explained: ?There is an increasing pressure on pi-rates from the government of Puntland. The only functional ground based activ- ity that I have seen is the Somalia Marine Force, local anti-piracy militias in Bargal and arrests made by Puntland police.Puntland has gone from being blamed forsupporting piracy to being the most ag- gressive land based force working to eliminate it. It?s a pity that international groups who are also working to defeat piracy do not support and co-ordinate with these na-tional entities. Watch for dramatic events from the new Somalia Marine Force. They will bring around 1000 trained lo- cals, air assets, naval assets and a very so- phisticated approach to the elimination ofpiracy in Puntland.? With more shipping firms employing private security companies to guard their vessels, it seems clear that the methods used by Somali pirates will have to evolve. Robert Young Pelton agrees, ?[We will see] More audacious attacks like the near land or at anchor attacks, land based at-tacks to grab western victims. It is an en-trepreneurial model with low cost of entry, multiple attacks to try new tactics and little risk. So I fully expect pirate groups to sur- prise us with each attack in 2012 ratherthan maintain the status quo, which asSomalia Report predicted last year, is now dead.? As the UK government continues to ratify the procedures needed to vet mar- itime security companies so that UK-flagged vessels can employ armed VPTs5, it seems that they are becoming the de facto defense against Somali pi- rates and insurers agree. 2012?s pirate season has already kicked off with one reported casualty thus far ? an Iranian chemical tanker ? although ac- tual details of this hijacking remainscarce. With more vessels carrying armed se- curity details and the continued use ofcitadels and Best Management Practice,this year could be the most interesting yetin the fight against an illegal industry which is estimated to cost the globaleconomy as much as $8 billion eachyear7.COLUMNMARITIME SECURITYThe Pirate Surge that Never Was About the AuthorDavid Rider is Neptune Maritime Security?s Communications Offi- cer, and has 20 years? experience in journalism and communica-tions. Email [email protected]:http://www.triton-risk.com/2011/09/14/eunavfor-monsoons-ending-expect-pirate-surge/ http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures http://somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1950/Weekly_Piracy_Report http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/1912 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15510467 http://www.solaceglobalmaritime.com/news/insurance-rates-predicted-to-fall-for-vessels-carrying-armed-guards.php http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/geopolicity_-_the_economics_of_piracy_- _pirates__livelihoods_off_the_coast_of_somalia.pdf 18Maritime Reporter & Engineering News MR Feb.12 # 3 (18-25):MR Template 2/6/2012 12:33 PM Page 18