Page 88: of Maritime Reporter Magazine (November 2016)
U.S. NAVY REPORT
We were constantly goaded into describing the ship physically. We avoided that completely. We didn’t want to be tied to a design that people would focus on, or take issue with. We were interested in characteristics and capabilities, regardless of the platform.
SS Zumwalt (DDG the required operational characteristics pulses which were envisioned as prob- a ship, and how to con? gure propulsion 1000), commissioned those ships would need to meet the fore- able in a full combat scenario.” and systems to dedicate available space on Oct. 15, 2016, in cast threat. Connors said the SOCS study’s ship for weapons and combat systems.
Baltimore, Md., is dif- The SOCS study took a fresh look at design criteria required “hardened” “The stealth qualities would allow us
Uferent in almost every legal, institutional, operational and cul- electronic systems to prevent or reduce to get to the ? ght; while the survivability way from any other surface combatant tural factors that resulted in surface com- EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) degrada- would allow us to stay in the ? ght, even if a? oat. Although it is the most techni- batant designs, and the operational and tion of combat capabilities. In our rec- damaged,” Gunn said. “With improved cally advanced destroyer in any Navy, maintenance practices that drove man- ommendations, celestial navigation and navigation and cooperative engagement it embodies concepts ? rst proposed in a power requirements. piloting, traditional Navy skills, were capabilities, we could enhance our prob- study completed in 1988, at the height of One of Metcalf’s staff of? cers, Capt. retained as important even with the en- ability of hitting the target.” the Cold War. Lee Gunn, was picked to lead the SOCS hanced capabilities provided by a grow- To achieve stealth, acoustic, infra-
The genesis begins with Vice Adm. Joe effort. Gunn, who retired as a vice ad- ing satellite array. Later however, the red, magnetic and electronic signatures
Metcalf, who was the Deputy Chief of miral in 2000, had a master’s degree Navy deemphasized celestial naviga- would be below those of decoys and de-
Naval Operations for Surface Warfare in operations research from the naval tion. More recently, celestial navigation ception. (OP-03) on the Navy staff. Postgraduate School in Monterey, Ca- training has been reinstated for surface Quiet machinery and other reduced
It was Metcalf who created the Surface lif. Metcalf gave him a million dollars, warfare of? cers.” acoustic signatures provided better pas-
Warfare community from the unrestrict- one year, and a straightforward mission. During the course of the SOCS study, sive sonar capability and torpedo de- ed line, and introduced the Surface War- “We had to answer one question: How Connors said the team considered a va- fense. Cooperative engagement allowed fare insignia and even the SWO sweater, to put maximum ordnance on target from riety of hull designs, including SWATH. a ship to receive situational awareness borrowed from the Royal Navy’s “wool- a given size ship, but that size was not “A great deal of that thinking—higher and targeting from other platforms to ly pulley,” to build a sense of identity. speci? ed.” speed, sea keeping, shallow draft—was reduce own-ship emissions and maintain
He sent new of? cers through Surface The group started with few assump- incorporated into the LCS design.” stealth.
Warfare Of? cers School, and developed tions. The ships were assumed to be Through the analysis, they also discov- Damage control and survivability was a warfare quali? cation system based on battle force capable in combat; capable ered some low-hanging fruit, good ideas a single issue. A new survivability stan- “personal quali? cation standards” that of battle force speeds; capable of inde- that were available and reasonably inex- dard was adopted so the ship could con- rivaled the aviation and submarine com- pendent multi-domain warfare—up, out pensive that could adopted right away. tinue to ? ght even after being damaged munities. and down; and having a suitable but un- Many of them, such as the “paperless by a missile or torpedo, and survive if
Metcalf viewed the battle space as speci? ed hull form. ship,” which evolved into “Smart Ship,” damaged by two hits. multidimensional—up, down and out— “The goal of Group MIKE was to de- were implemented on existing platforms. “We wanted to protect the crew, and where surface, air and undersea warfare velop a revolutionary family of warships The team realized that improved infor- have the ship live to ? ght again. We also had to be conducted simultaneously. In that will maximize ordnance on target,” mation systems had many bene? ts. The wanted to be able to ? ght while hurt,” each domain, ordnance on target was said Tracy Connors, PhD, a retired Navy idea of a “paperless ship,” where paper Gunn said. “We didn’t want to be put surface warfare’s primary mission. captain who was part of the study group. was eliminated as a storage medium— out of action while we still had a full “Nothing was off the table,” Connors was studied aboard USS Vincennes (CG magazine.”
Group MIKE said. “We looked at weapons, propul- 49). It was found that she carried nearly That called for a robust distributed
He created Group MIKE (for Metcalf) sion, hull and every functional area 40 tons of paper, more than half of that internal arrangement of key systems, in 1987 to develop a new breed of war- of ship design, each with its own core above the main deck. armor and barriers, and redundant path- ships to examine the art of the possible group of analysts.” Using desktop computers and mag- ways for power, communications and using emerging technology. “Out of that, each area of ship design netic storage media reduced weight and ? re main. The network could detect a
Metcalf stood up two study groups— was advanced, evaluated and priori- volume and improved ef? ciency, and breach and reroute itself. “This concept the Ship Operational Characteristics tized,” Connors said. “We were pushing that was based upon the existing IBM showed great promise for things like in-
Study (SOCS) and the Surface Com- the limits of technology, not just engi- PC 80-386 technology of the day. ternal communications, and being able batant Force Requirement Study (SC- neering.” “We knew we engaged in important to plug in new systems as they became
FRS)—to examine the operational char- “Each of us on Capt. Gunn’s SOCS planning and analysis,” Connors said. available.” Gunn said. acteristics required of surface combatant team were assigned responsibility for “There was quiet, but deeply felt pride During both routine operations and in and how many would be needed respec- certain core capabilities,” Connors said. in what we did and in those with whom an emergency, there is a critical need to tively. “Mine was navigation. Interestingly, we served.” understand what’s happening on a ship.
The SCFRS (pronounced “skiffers”) while we envisioned satellite naviga- A suite of sensors – to measure moisture, report assessed and validated the num- tion as an important capability, we also Maximum Ordnance on Target temperature, light, heat and vibration – bers, types and capabilities of surface understood the threat to navigation – as In looking at the problem with an eye could be installed on the network, to col- combatants needed during the coming well as other combat systems – inher- to “maximum ordnance on target,” the lect data on the steady state conditions quarter century, while SOCS studied ent in the possibility of electromagnetic study group looked at the volume inside on the ship.
88 Maritime Reporter & Engineering News • NOVEMBER 2016
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