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report of the computer crash appeared in repeaters on the bridge and on the in- company, largely owned by the Russian a technical publication. The Navy then tegrated system had no such warning government - touché); a major interna- acknowledged the incident, stating that signal. The integrated system showed tional law ? rm; a multinational advertis- the Yorktown had experienced “an en- that the ship was on its planned course ing and public relations company; and gineering local area network casualty.” from Bermuda to Boston. The current, A.P. Moller-Maersk (the world’s largest

Needless to say, the Smart Ship program though, had carried the ship west into shipping company). Sadly, this malware was extensively revised. shoal water. The navigation team on the attack was largely preventable. One of

On the night of June 10, 1995, the bridge had gotten so comfortable with the security vulnerabilities exploited cruise ship Royal Majesty grounded on the process that they relied solely on by the malware to infect the various

Rose and Crown Shoal just east of Nan- the integrated system, not checking the computer systems had been identi? ed tucket Island. The ship was equipped radar, the fathometer, or even paying at- months previously. Patches had been is- with all the latest electronic naviga- tention to the buoys and the shore lights sued by Microsoft and various computer tion equipment, including an integrated until the grounding. In June 2017, some- security companies. It appears that at bridge system. The GPS receiver was one or some group (suspicion has fallen least some of the affected entities ne- located in the chart room, which was on the Russian government) slipped glected to fully install and activate the seldom visited. GPS signals from that some malware into an update to a soft- available patches. receiver were transmitted to repeaters on ware system utilized by the Ukrainian the bridge and to the integrated system. electrical grid. That malware not only The Threat

Unfortunately, the antenna wire con- shut down the national grid, it also hob- Bad actors in? ltrate computer systems necting the GPS antenna to the GPS re- bled the remaining portion of the Cher- for a variety of reasons and utilize a va- ceiver had come loose. The GPS receiv- nobyl nuclear plant. It then migrated to riety of techniques. Sometimes, these er defaulted to its dead reckoning mode. computer systems worldwide. Among individuals or groups want to steal the

A ? ashing red light on the GPS receiver those incurring this collateral damage data. Sometimes they want to hold the clearly indicated this situation, but the were: Rosneft (the largest Russian oil data for money, utilizing so-called ran-

THOUGHT LEADERSHIP: BIG DATA

In December 2004, Crew members assigned to the guided missile cruiser USS Yorktown (CG 48) man the rails for the ? nal time in preparation of the order to de-man the ship as she is decommissioned on board Naval Station Pascagoula, Miss.

In 1996, the Yorktown was selected to be the testbed for Navy’s Smart Ship program, effectively exposing a major ? aw in the system when a simple error left the ship blacked out for hours.

28 Maritime Reporter & Engineering News • AUGUST 2017

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