Page 14: of Maritime Reporter Magazine (December 2017)

Maritime Cyber Security

CYBER SECURITY

The Wrong Formula

About the Authors

Professor Scott Blough is a faculty member at Tif? n University, Tif? n Ohio,

For many industries, cyber security detection system, and antivirus soft- what security is in the physical world, and directs the school’s Center for is about target hardening and perimeter ware. Target hardening is a bit more and what happens when we violate that

Cyber Defense & Forensics.

defense. This makes sense, as cyber obscure, but nonetheless, we can still security. security is implemented in much the it in action in our secure facilities. We As for cyber security, recognizing the same way that physical security is im- understand locked doors, escorts, au- security measures in regards to hard- plemented. We often think of it in terms thorized access only signs, and visitor ware and network diagrams can be just of the medieval castle design, which badges. For target hardening in cyber as simple. The breakdown is with the translates to defense in depth in mod- security world, we use things such as understanding of the consequences of ern vernacular. The focus on defense network segmentation, air gaps, and violating security measures. We have in depth can be explained by a simple disabling certain features such as usb been taught that technology is designed equation: drive access. Again, even though we to make work and play more ef? cient may not be able to see physically touch and entertaining. Therefore, we associ- it, we can see it on a network diagram ate technology (i.e cyber) as a mecha-

SECURITY = HARDENED TARGET + and feel safe. nism for convenience. I know very few

PERIMETER DEFENSE

The maritime system has long been people that would willingly climb a se-

This formula makes sense, as we a place where physical security has curity fence to get from point A to point can see and touch perimeter defense in taken a very high priority. We have B, even if it required that they walk physical security. We have seen and are gates, fences, restricted access, guards, an extra mile. The reason is that they comfortable with things such as fenc- cameras, and signs. We feel safe seeing physically see the barrier and under-

Kyle Johnson is the Information Secu- ing, ingress and egress areas (think those. In addition to feeling safe, we stand the consequence: climb the fence rity Of? cer at Indiana Tech, a university doors, drives, sidewalks), guard sta- also understand that if we violate a se- and risk being arrested. They make a in Fort Wayne, IN. His work focuses on tions, and cameras. We like thinks we curity measure, we will face some sort logical decision to walk around using a governance, awareness, and maintain- can see and touch. In the cyber secu- of consequence, ranging from being es- simple cost bene? t analysis. The same ing the overall security posture for the rity world, this translates into ? rewalls, corted off of the property to going to cannot be said for cyber security.

university.

intrusion prevention systems, intrusion prison. So, we have a clear vision of According to Vircom (2017), human © sdecoret / Adobe Stock 14 Maritime Reporter & Engineering News • DECEMBER 2017

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