Page 38: of Marine Technology Magazine (January 2025)

SUBSEA DEFENSE

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Com- munication Specialist 1st Class

Brian M. Brooks/RELEASED

Knife? sh is a medium-class mine countermeasure UUV designed for deployment off the Littoral Combat Ship. cable networks. These cables also facilitate secure military- (Wilson Center, Polar Institute, 2024). Among CUI, ? ber op- encrypted and diplomatic communications, underscoring their tic data and communication cables are particularly susceptible strategic importance (Wilson Center, Polar Institute, 2024). to disruption. The Arctic region exempli? es this vulnerability

In today’s competitive and threat-laden environment, the due to its geographic and natural chokepoints, like the Sval- vulnerabilities of our expanding subsea data and energy trans- bard, Greenland–Iceland–UK (GIUK), and Greenland–Ice- portation systems—responsible for transferring molecules land–Norway (GIN) gaps and the Bering Strait, where cable and electrons—are increasingly exposed. This highlights the resilience is minimal. This lack of redundancy, along with in- critical importance of subsea defense. creasing geopolitical importance of the Arctic, makes cables in the region prime targets for seabed warfare (Wilson Center,

Vulnerabilities and Attack Vectors Polar Institute, 2024).

Subsea infrastructure, while critical, is fraught with vul- While, in most places, cables are widespread across the nerabilities that pose signi? cant risks to global security and ocean ? oor, reducing bottleneck risks, their landing stations economic stability. can become focal points for potential attacks due to their geographical concentration (Kavanagh, 2023). Coordinated

Physical Vulnerabilities attacks on critical nodes could cause cascading failures, sig-

Subsea security and seabed warfare have become prominent ni? cantly affecting systems and escalating costs, with broader issues in the context of gray zone operations and sub-thresh- economic and societal repercussions (Rand, 2024).

old warfare against critical underwater infrastructure (CUI). Practically speaking, in deeper waters, cables lie unprotected

For hostile state actors, disrupting CUI is an attractive strategy on the seabed, making them less vulnerable to anchoring or due to its low-cost, high-impact potential, driven by critical trawling but more susceptible to deliberate sabotage. Addi- dependencies and the cascading effects disruptions can have tionally, the public availability of detailed maps displaying 38 January/February 2025

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