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Page 39: of Marine Technology Magazine (January 2025)
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cable locations increases their exposure coordinated assaults could trigger dev- tween Sweden and Lithuania, and Ger- to malicious acts (TeleGeography). astating cascading effects—potentially many and Finland severed, raising sus- serving as precursors to larger military picions of sabotage (Guardian, 2024).
Attack Vectors actions or coercive strategies. Protecting Globally, the South China Sea and the
One of the key vulnerabilities of sub- this critical infrastructure is essential, Red Sea have been identi? ed as choke- sea infrastructure lies in its geographi- requiring robust surveillance measures points for undersea cables. In March cal isolation. The lack of an immediate and international collaboration to ad- 2024, several major cables in the Red Sea human presence at these sites makes dress these growing vulnerabilities. were cut, impacting 25% of data traf? c physical threats, such as attacks on ? ber between Asia and Europe (Rand, 2024).
optic and copper cables, relatively easy These threats are not just isolated in-Recent Examples of Threats to execute (Turing Institute, CETAS). In recent years, several incidents have cidents but may form part of broader
This remoteness also results in longer highlighted the vulnerabilities of sub- strategic maneuvers. At the onset of response times for security services, sea infrastructure. In 2023, Taiwanese potential hostilities, cable disruptions further compounding the risk. authorities accused Chinese vessels of can serve as tactical enablers, prepar-
The rise of autonomous underwater ve- cutting submarine cables that are criti- ing the battlespace for larger military hicles (AUVs) and drones has introduced cal for internet connectivity to Taiwan’s operations. Such disruptions often occur a new dimension of threats. These tech- Matsu Islands (CSIS, 2024). The inci- alongside coordinated activities, mark- nologies can be exploited for hostile sur- dent left 14,000 residents in digital iso- ing the “? rst salvo” in broader con? ict veillance or direct attacks. Additionally, lation for six weeks. strategies (Wilson Center, Polar Insti- as drone-based operations and mainte- In the Baltic Sea, a telecom cable link- tute, 2024).
nance (O&M) become more common, ing Sweden and Estonia was damaged the risk of hacking or malware implan- alongside a Finnish-Estonian pipeline
Threats to Subsea tation during production grows. Such and cable in October 2023, with investi-
Infrastructure vulnerabilities could allow malicious ac- gations pointing to Russian and Chinese Subsea infrastructure is increasingly tors to manipulate drones once they are vessels as potential saboteurs (Reuters, threatened by activities that fall within operational (The Diplomat, 2023). These 2023b). Further incidents in November the realm of plausibly deniable, sub- advancements not only enhance the ca- 2024 saw communication cables be- threshold operations. These threats are pabilities of state actors but also extend sophisticated tools to terrorist organiza- tions and criminal networks, broadening the scope of potential threats.
The subsea cable industry also faces critical supply chain risks. China’s rapid emergence as a leading subsea cable supplier, driven by its Digital Silk Road initiative, has positioned it to capture a signi? cant share of the global ? ber-op- tic market. Companies like HMN Tech- nologies, which supplied up to 18% of subsea cables between in 2019-2023, play a major role in expanding global cable infrastructure (Reuters, 2023a).
However, this dominance raises national security concerns, particularly among
NATO members (CSIS, 2024). Firm- ware and software used in cable landing stations could be compromised before installation, with adversaries potentially embedding bugs or surveillance devices in hardware. Once breached, attackers could manipulate cable controls or dis- rupt operations.
While a single attack on subsea infra- structure might cause limited disruption, www.marinetechnologynews.com 39
MTR #1 (34-47).indd 39 2/4/2025 9:16:03 AM