Page 40: of Marine Technology Magazine (January 2025)

SUBSEA DEFENSE often carried out by state and non-state actors using dedicated for critical infrastructure, re? ecting a coordinated effort units, structures, and subsurface capabilities. across Europe (Rand, 2024). The collaboration between the

There are two primary categories of seabed warfare activi- EU and NATO also aims at improving the resilience of critical ties that adversaries might conduct against underwater cables: infrastructure. The EU-NATO Task Force has recommended intelligence gathering and physical destruction. further cooperation in monitoring and safeguarding maritime assets, resulting in initiatives such as the NATO Critical Un- ¯ Intelligence Gathering dersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell in Brussels and a Mar-

This involves mapping and monitoring seabed infrastruc- itime Centre for Security in London (Rand, 2024).

ture, primarily conducted by civilian vessels and uncrewed

Public-Private Collaborations underwater vehicles equipped with remote-sensing capabili- ties (Wilson Center, Polar Institute, 2024). Such operations By working with private companies, governments can better allow actors to prepare for potential acts of sabotage and gain identify and protect critical elements of these systems. For ex- awareness of the cable layout. The physical tapping of cables ample, RAND suggests establishing an international undersea to intercept communications, although technically challeng- infrastructure protection corps to combine public and private ing, is another form of intelligence gathering. resources in safeguarding subsea assets (Rand, 2024).

In Germany, various stakeholders, including the German ¯ Physical Destruction Navy, Federal Police, and Federal Maritime and Hydrographic

This more direct form of attack involves severing cables or Agency, are contributing their expertise to ensure the success using undersea explosives like torpedoes or maritime impro- of initiatives aimed at protecting subsea infrastructure. North.

vised explosive devices (MIEDs) to damage or destroy them io, a German company focusing on organization and manage- (Wilson Center, Polar Institute, 2024). Such actions can be ment of geospatial data with the help of AI, leads the effort2.

disguised as accidental, using “ghost ships” to conduct an- Germany’s Argus project, supported by the Federal Minis- choring and dredging activities. try of Digital and Transport, further aims to utilize big data and AI technologies to protect critical underwater infrastruc-

Defense of Subsea Infrastructure ture. This 3.5 million initiative involves collaboration with

Given its critical role, the protection of subsea infrastructure the GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre and focuses on developing presents numerous business opportunities, spanning chal- autonomous systems for enhanced monitoring1.

lenges across sea, land, and cyberspace and in various sectors, including cables, landing stations, and repair ships. Entrepre- Technological Solutions neurs should recognize the critical role of these infrastructures The protection of subsea infrastructure relies heavily on ad- and prioritize their defense as a vital component of national vanced technological innovations that enhance detection, in- security, opening avenues for innovation and investment. spection, and response capabilities. The sheer volume of data

International and Regional Partnerships generated by the automatic generation system (AIS) signals,

In December 2023, a multinational effort named SeaSEC port calls, and ship-to-ship meetings presents a challenge in was initiated by the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Fin- ? ltering out critical threats from the noise (Windward, 2024a). land, Norway, and Sweden. This program seeks to develop In addition, malicious actors may manipulate data to obscure advanced methods for monitoring underwater infrastructure their activities. Detecting such deceptive practices and decod- in the North and Baltic Seas, focusing on pipelines, wind tur- ing data becomes necessary to ensure reliable maritime do- bine platforms, and internet cables1. main awareness.

In April 2024, countries bordering the North Sea—including

Belgium, Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Detection and Inspection Technologies the UK—agreed to work together on enhancing security for Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and AUVs are essential subsea energy and telecommunications infrastructure. This tools for identifying unauthorized objects like surveillance was quickly followed by a similar agreement among eight devices or explosives that might be attached to subsea infra-

Baltic Sea nations to protect offshore energy assets. structure. These vehicles are supported by customized launch

On a broader level, there is an ongoing debate on whether and recovery systems, which ensure their safe and effective

CUI should be recognized as an operational domain of war- deployment (Royal IHC). They also employ sensors to detect fare (Wilson Center, Polar Institute, 2024). This could po- potential threats, enhancing situational awareness.

tentially lead to CUI being declared an of? cial operational For monitoring underwater installations such as cables and domain, enabling more comprehensive legal and military pro- pipelines, ROVs, AUVs, and towed systems are equipped with tection strategies. advanced launch and recovery systems (LARS), enabling pre-

As of now, the European Union (EU)’s Critical Entities Di- cise control during operations (Royal IHC). These inspection rective requires member states to enact protective measures systems are complemented by hydrographic surveying tools, 40 January/February 2025

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