Page 12: of Maritime Reporter Magazine (December 2017)

Alternative Compliance

About the Author

Dennis L. Bryant is with Bryant’s Mari-

GOVERNMENT UPDATE

Program time Consulting, and a regular contribu- tor to Maritime Reporter & Engineering

News as well as online at MaritimePro- fessional.com. t: 1 352 692 5493 e: [email protected]

The 1 October 2015 loss of the U.S. Owners and operators of certain ABS- loss of the US cargo ship El Faro, the last compliance survey on El Faro nor cargo vessel El Faro along with its 33 classed, Coast Guard inspected vessels Coast Guard Traveling Inspector Staff did it require launching or witness the member crew led to the convening of a were invited to participate. This was conducted oversight inspections of a lifeboats operating in the water.

Coast Guard Marine Board of Investiga- followed by publication of a proposed number of vessels participating in the As a result of being enrolled in the tion charged with determining as closely rulemaking on 22 June 1995 and prom- ACP. It became clear that multiple ACP ACP, El Faro and its company (TOTE) as possible the cause(s) of the casualty; ulgation of an interim ? nal rule on 27 vessels had been operating for prolonged were required to be in compliance with whether there is evidence that any failure December 1996. The interim ? nal rule periods in a substandard material condi- the International Safety Management of material was involved; whether there expanded the ACP to all qualifying clas- tion. The Alternative Compliance Pro- (ISM) Code. This required, among other is evidence of misconduct, inattention to si? cation societies. It should be noted gram did not directly cause the loss of El things, a Safety Management System duty, negligence, or willful violation of that this rulemaking was completed in Faro. It was, though, a contributing fac- (SMS). TOTE’s Emergency Response law; and whether there is evidence that near-record time, evidencing the tremen- tor due to various de? ciencies identi? ed Manual (ERM) under the SMS did not government personnel contributed to the dous pressure being exerted on the Coast during the Marine Board’s investigation. contain information related to any opera- casualty. The Marine Board released its Guard by the maritime industry. El Faro was enrolled in the ACP on 27 tional safety-related emergencies includ- report on 1 October 2017, the second an- Under the ACP, each ACS worked February 2006. The Marine Board iden- ing adverse weather, ? ooding, loss of niversary of the casualty. with the Coast Guard to develop a “US ti? ed various points at which the ACP is stability, cargo shifting, or abandon ship.

The Marine Board’s report, which is Supplement” identifying those inspec- not operating as envisioned. Neither Coast Guard marine inspectors not ? nal until approved by the Com- tion items and standards required by the At the time of the El Faro casualty, nor class society surveyors identi? ed any mandant, found no single cause for this Coast Guard that were absent from or the applicable U.S. Supplement had last de? ciencies in the El Faro SMS during tragic event. Rather, as in most such treated differently by the classi? cation been updated in April 2011, making it the last ACP examinations of the vessel. incidents, there were numerous factors society’s rules. The US Supplement for four years out of date. Other shortfalls in the ACP identi? ed that combined in the fatal voyage of El each ACS is required to be updated an- The majority of inspections, surveys, by the Marine Board include:

Faro from Jacksonville to San Juan in nually and procedures were established and examinations of El Faro were con- 2015. This article will only focus on one to provide for this. When an ACS sur- ducted by either the class society survey- a. The ACP training course for of those factors: perceived de? ciencies veyor was conducting an inspection on ors or Coast Guard marine inspectors; ACS surveyors and Coast Guard marine in the USCG Alternative Compliance behalf of the Coast Guard, the surveyor they were rarely conducted by both at inspectors to interact and become famil-

Program. The Alternative Compliance was obligated to utilize the US Supple- the same time. It should be noted that iar with the program never materialized.

Program (ACP) is a protocol whereby ment as applicable. ACP policy did not require a minimum b. ACS surveyors and Coast the US Coast Guard delegates to an au- Unfortunately, the ACP appears to level of Coast Guard oversight exams to Guard marine inspectors are often un- thorized classi? cation society (ACS) the have lost its signi? cance as it became be conducted in conjunction with an au- familiar with the program requirements authority to perform speci? c inspections routine. The Coast Guard billet for Li- thorized class society (ACS) inspection. and the U.S. Supplement.

of US-? ag vessels on its behalf. The aison Of? cer for the Recognized and El Faro did not conduct required un- c. There is no minimum quali? ca-

ACP was initiated in the mid-1990s in Authorized Class Societies (LORACS) derway operational tests of its lifeboats tion level required for Coast Guard ma- response to complaints by ship owners was eliminated in 2012. Coast Guard during the last inspection for certi? ca- rine inspectors to conduct ACP oversight and operators that their ships were un- marine inspectors originally conducted tion prior to the accident voyage. At the exams.

dergoing duplicative inspections by the their annual overview inspections of time of the last inspection, ACP policy d. The Coast Guard does not re-

US Coast Guard and surveys by classi? - ACP participating vessels in conjunc- dictated that the Coast Guard was re- quire marine inspectors to be trained as cation societies that resulted in unneces- tion with ACS surveyors to ensure that sponsible for observing the operational auditors.

sary delays in ship schedules. their mutual understandings of USCG lifeboat tests in the water and assessing e. Classi? cation society training

On 12 January 1995, the Coast Guard requirements were aligned. These joint the crew’s performance during those requirements for certain inspection ac- and the American Bureau of Shipping inspections atrophied over time and be- tests, which were supposed to be con- tivities (e.g., overseeing repairs to a pro- (ABS) signed a memorandum of un- came the exception rather than the rule. ducted during the ACP oversight exami- pulsion steam boiler) are far less than the derstanding (MOU) to establish a pilot Class societies and their surveyors were nation. The authorized class society did Coast Guard would require for a marine program for an alternative to certain tra- not held accountable for substandard not identify any concerns related to life- inspector conducting a similar inspec- ditional Coast Guard vessel inspections. ACP inspections. Following the 2015 saving gear or drills after conducting the tion activity.

12 Maritime Reporter & Engineering News • DECEMBER 2017

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