THE CIRCLE OF RELIANCE " I n Time of War, Land, Sea, and Air Forces and All Logistic Support Functions Must Work as a Team"

A conclusion stated in the 1983 Annual Report as to the prospects that commercial merchant marines will not, in the future, meet national security requirements and a statement of the maritime problem that must be solved both remain valid.

They are: "CONCLUSION—Due to dramatic shifts both in commercial markets and government policies, here and abroad, commercial markets that have previously been relied upon to provide sealift, shipbuilding, and shiprepair assets required to fulfill national security objectives can no longer be relied upon to provide these assets." " P R O B L E M S T A T E M E N T— Faced with the above conclusion, how should the nation provide (1) sealift assets in sufficient quantity and possessing operational characteristics as determined by national security demand, and (2) shipbuilding and shiprepair capability and capacity defined as essential to meet national security needs—both at lowest cost in toto?" A solution to the problem is demonstrably required.

In time of war, land, sea, and air forces and all logistic support functions must work as a team. Military commanders must be able to assess with accuracy their commands' abilities and insure that these capabilities work in concert with companion forces and support functions to achieve defined objectives.

It is assumed that both the ability to work jointly and required support capabilities exist. Unfortunately, these fundamental requirements are not tested by analyzing the ability of all interlocked components to support each other. Civilian leaders are not expert in such determinations, while military leaders are neither empowered nor expected to judge the capabilities of companion force and support functions. Indeed, beyond military capability, we assume that very substantial support elements are and will remain available from non-military sources, both government and commercial in our nation and those of our Allies.

The U.S. does not have a system that provides overall coordination of military needs with industrial capacity.

Our principal adversary does. Instead, the U.S. has a "Circle of Reliance" where each service assumes that "If I'm okay, you're okay" and that all required non-military support functions, including those of our Allies, are also okay.

Consider the maritime element of the Circle. The Army, Air Force, and Marines rely on the Navy to provide military sealift. The Navy relies on its controlled assets and on the Department of Transportation (DoT) to fulfill responsibilities under the Merchant Marine Acts to provide ships, men, and shipyards needed to meet sealift needs. The DoT relies on the White House direction—both to insure the availability of our Allies' large shipping and shipbuilding resources and to set policy under which DoT can perform its statutory duty to maintain required U.S.-controlled shipping and shipbuilding assets—and the Administration relies on the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Marines to maintain forces necessary to defend the nation. The circle goes around and around. Is the untested reliance justified?

The Administration has adopted a maritime policy that severely limits support of commercial shipping and shipbuilding. It is assumed without analysis and test that Navy and commercial support will, under existing ground rules, provide sufficient assets to meet wartime demands.

The Navy has become highly concerned that these policies will not provide the required U.S. sealift needs. However the Navy, in seeking to build its combatant fleet, logically rejects the diversion of its limited fund resources to provide national assets that heretofore have been provided without significant cost to the Navy. The Army, Air Force, and Marines assume that deployment and logistic support needs will be met, but have no means to insure that this is so.

It is assumed that the entire dry cargo sealift to support a NATO crisis will be provided from the fleets of NATO Allies. These Allies rely almost exclusively upon commercial forces to provide the ships and shipyards needed to support their sealift commitments. The shipping and shipbuilding assets of the principal NATO Allies are in rapid decline.

Specifically, the adoption of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences by most of the world's trading nations, and its rejection by the U.S., have consequences upon our NATO Allies that have never been factored into forward defense planning and the development of international defense strategies.

If the Circle of Reliance is analyzed, logic compels the conclusion that the ability of our military to effectively use force capabilities being provided may fail for want of sealift and shipyard resources only assumed to be available.

Maritime Reporter Magazine, page 50, Jun 1985

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